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Abstract
This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their
own community and therefore help forming tax morale in a constituency. We derive a
theoretical model to investigate government’s decision to expand tax revenues from al-
ternative sources, namely changing the country’s culture of tax compliance or expanding
fiscal capacity. Despite the two are initially substitute, we show how in equilibrium dy-
namic complementarity arises. Our mechanism exploits exogenous variation in the cost of
tax morale formation, induced by an expected war (either internal or external) that makes
easier for the government to mobilize the constituency. We motivate our theory through a
novel cross-country analysis that uses information on war frequency, tax morale, and fiscal
capacity. We additionally discuss some historical cases consistent with our mechanism.
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1 Introduction
In recent years several works have analyzed the effects of wars on fiscal capacity, namely the
capacity of the states to raise taxes and provide public goods. Following the insights of Tilly
(1990), who argues that the European states had developed their fiscal infrastructures to deal
effectively with external threats, Besley and Persson (2008, 2009) find that fighting external
wars is conducive to building legal and fiscal capacity (in short, state capacity). The idea
behind the relationship between wars and state capacity is that in presence of an external
threat, common interest public goods, such as defense, become more valuable and this makes
it optimal setting up an infrastructure for raising the resources to finance it. Others have
highlighted that the effect of military competition on state capacity may not be always positive
however; Gennaioli and Voth (2015) for example show that this is the case only when money
is important for military success.
While high fiscal capacity requires high rates of tax compliance by citizens, another strand
of the literature has pointed out that compliance rates cannot be fully explained by the level
of enforcement and that tax morale, namely the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, is instead a
key determinant of tax compliance (Andreoni et al., 1998; Torgler, 2007; Luttmer and Singhal,
2014). In other words, there is a vast consensus that the existence of a culture of compliance
is essential for raising revenues in any country. While there is less consensus on the deter-
minants of tax morale, the literature has identified in the perception individuals have about
the government, the fairness of the tax schedule, culture and beliefs, as well as the presence
of ethnic differences as important factors affecting the intrinsic motivation of citizens to pay
taxes (Hofmann et al. 2008; Lago-Pen˜as and Lago-Pen˜as, 2010; Halla, 2012; Belmonte et al.,
2016). Some more recent works (Feldman and Slemrod, 2009; Konrad and Qari, 2012) have
also argued that patriotism and citizens mobilization for a common cause can be an important
determinants of tax compliance.
In this paper, we study how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their
own community and therefore help forming tax morale in a constituency. We study govern-
ments’ decision to invest in tax morale formation and fiscal capacity expansion in wartime and
peacetime and characterize dynamic complementarity between the two sources of tax collec-
tion. The basic idea of our model is that war reduces the cost of tax morale formation through
mobilization fostering changes in tax compliance culture when fiscal capacity is already con-
solidated. The increase in revenues allows the government to meet military requirements and
push the menace away.
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Specifically, we develop a model where agents produce and pay taxes to finance the provision
of public goods. Producers can evade taxes and, in this case, they are detected (and sanctioned)
with some probability that depends on the fiscal capacity of the state. When evading taxes,
individuals may also suffer a utility loss depending on their degree of tax morale. Higher
tax compliance and a consolidated fiscal capacity therefore helps governments in rising tax
revenues. In wartime the government chooses the optimal provision of military resources,
given its level of tax revenues. If fiscal capacity and tax morale are insufficient for raising the
level of revenues required to finance the military facing the threat, then the government also
invests resources to finance to increase fiscal capacity and/or tax morale.
We characterize the equilibrium of the model and describe possible dynamics of fiscal
capacity and tax morale under different scenarios. Our results show that while fiscal capacity
and tax morale are substitutes, wars may lead to an increase in tax morale when fiscal capacity
is already relatively high. Our theory highlights two opposite mechanisms through which war
may or may not engender tax morale. First, the exposure to a war has a disruptive effect on
values and on tax morale. Second, warfare may help a community to overcoming the collective
action problem and, by this mean, to trigger the transmission of these values that correlate
with a culture of tax compliance. We show that the first effect dominates when fiscal capacity
is low, while the second effect outweighs the first one when fiscal capacity in high.
This result is consistent with a debate that economists led at the juncture of the 19th and
the 20th century to explain the victory of Unionists over Confederates in the American Civil
War (Hill, 1894; Dingley, 1899; Lerner, 1955). Common to the debate was the acknowledgment
of the chief role of the “ability and disposition [of the state] to draw from abundant revenue to
support the government” (Dingley, 1899). At the outbreak of the conflict, Unionists not only
had an institutional advantage in collecting taxes,1 but established a sophisticated propaganda
campaign to market almost $3 billions of bonds that saw a decisive participation of the citizenry.
The South lacked a well established fiscal capacity to levy or collect internal taxes and war
expenses were mostly met by indirect and trade taxes, printing of money, and loans that
however only earned $115 million in total (Burdekin and Langdana, 1993).
The success of the Northern bond market was unprecedented and for several scholars it
represented one of the root of the subsequent famous wartime sacrifice that has largely char-
acterized the history of the United States in the 20th century (Jones, 1988, 1996; Bank, Stark,
and Thorndike, 2008). The American experience is however not unique and the relationship
1In 1861 the Union government enacted the Revenue Act that imposes the first income tax in the country
at a flat rate of 3% on incomes above $800 (see Hill, 1894).
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between war, fiscal capacity, and tax morale quite general. In the last part of the paper, we
show that by collecting a unique dataset that retraces the history of the fiscal capacity and
the war frequency of 61 countries from the 1939. We have then matched this information with
today’s survey data on tax morale from the World Value Survey (WVS). Our estimates show
a positive correlation between war and tax morale only in countries with a relatively high
fiscal capacity; in countries with limited fiscal capacity, we rather find a negative association
between war and tax morale. These results hold both for external as well as for civil wars and
are robust to several measures of fiscal capacity proposed in the literature. They suggest that
past exposure to conflicts favored a culture of tax compliance only when such investment is
accompanied by a concomitant expansion of fiscal capacity.
Our paper connects with several strands of literature. The paper relates to the literature on
state capacity (e.g., Besley and Persson, 2008; Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni, 2011) and with
that on tax morale discussed above.2 Our work is at the best of our knowledge the first which
combines the two fields, studying how fiscal capacity expansion compelled by a threat of war
can additionally induce the government to engage in mobilization and in tax morale formation.3
It also differentiates with the first strand of literature in several respects. For example, we find
that a threat of an external war is not necessarily conducive of an expansion of fiscal capacity.
This equilibrium occurs when tax morale is low so that rising revenues through a fiscal capacity
expansion turns to be too costly. Beside, unlike some earlier findings (e.g., Besley and Persson,
2008), in our framework civil wars might not necessarily have negative effects on state capacity.
Indeed, we obtain that also civil wars may conduce to tax morale in presence of sufficiently
large fiscal capacity.
This latter result is consistent with the work of Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010) who
argue that civil wars may persist if the government does not invest enough resources in military
capacity for the fear of a takeover of the army; only in such circumstances the persistence of
internal conflicts is detrimental for tax morale, while civil wars might foster tax morale if the
government invests enough resources in repression and in mobilizing citizens.
Finally, this paper is related to the recently growing literature on the effects of the joint
interaction between culture and institutions on economic outcomes (see Ticchi, Verdier and
Vindigni, 2013; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2016).
2In addition, this paper is also related to the works by Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) and Dincecco
and Katz (2014), who study the long-run effects of fiscal centralization, and Dincecco and Prado (2012), who
uses past external wars to select exogenous variation of fiscal capacity on current GDP.
3For an example of how mobilization due an external threat may affect political institutions see Ticchi and
Vindigni (2008).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and analyzes the
equilibrium of the game. Section 3 extends the analysis to a dynamic setting. In Section 4 we
present our empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 The Framework
We consider an economy populated by a continuum of agents of measure one living for two
periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. There are N groups in the population and each member of group j ∈
{1, ..., N} has income Y j and size nj . Average and total income in the economy is equal to
Y =
N∑
j=1
njY j . The government finances its expenditures by imposing a proportional taxation
at rate τ ; taxation does not create distortions for all τ ≤ τˆ , while distortions are prohibitively
high for τ > τˆ . In each period, individuals decide whether to pay taxes or not; ξji,t ∈ {0, 1} is an
indicator function denoting whether individual i of group j has evaded taxes (ξji,t = 0) or not
(ξji,t = 1) at time t; as we shall assume no heterogeneity within groups, all agents in a given
group j will make the same decisions and, therefore, we can employ the indicator function
ξjt ∈ {0, 1}. The government might use the revenues T =
N∑
j=1
ξjτnjY j for the provision of a
public good, Q, that benefits equally all the citizens, such as national health system, and for
financing the military expenditure, G, to deal with internal or external threat. We assume
that the same group remains in power in both periods and that agents do not discount utility.
The existence of a threat is publicly revealed at time t = 1 and the conflict takes place only
in the second period; µ and ν are two indicator functions; µ ∈ {0, 1} denotes the existence of
a threat (µ = 1) or not (µ = 0) at time 1, and ν ∈ {0, 1} denotes the choice of the government
at time 2 to fight (ν = 1) or not (ν = 0) the enemy. Fighting an internal or external threat
is a public good which provides a utility to each citizens of group j equal to αjγGβ, where
αj > 0 represents the weight attached by each agent to this public good and γ ≥ 0 captures the
level of the threat. G is the level of security the government aims to provide to citizens (e.g.,
the probability of defeat the foreign enemy or the rebels) and β is its elasticity. We assume
that β < 1 so that G delivers a decreasing marginal return. Likewise, θ is the elasticity from
the public good Q and we assume for simplicity θ < 1. This yields the following two periods
quasi-linear utility function for each individual i of group j:
(1− τ1)Y j + (1− τ2)Y j + µγαjGβ + (1− µ)Qθ. (1)
Individuals hence derive utility from a two periods flow of post-tax income and from the
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provision of the public good G in war times (i.e., µ = 1) and from Q in peace times (i.e.,
µ = 0). Finally, we assume that the military technology is such that unit of government
resources can be transformed into one unit of G.
When individuals evade taxes they bear a utility cost M ≥ 0 which depends positively on
their level of tax morale. Tax evaders get caught with probability p and, in this case, they
pay a sanction S; therefore the expected sanction is E = pS; as we will see, this is a measure
of fiscal capacity of the state. In the first period of time, fiscal capacity and tax morale are
exogenously given at levels E1 = p1S1 and M1 ≥ 0. However, the government can invest
resources to increase fiscal capacity and tax morale in the subsequent period.
The cost of increasing the level of fiscal capacity is H (∆E), where ∆E = E2−E1, and with
H ′ (·) > 0, H ′′ (·) > 0, and H (0) = 0. The cost of increasing tax morale is C (∆M ; ν), where
∆M = M2−M1, and with C (·) increasing and convex in ∆M . We also assume that the cost of
increasing tax morale is lower when there is an internal or external threat and the government
decides to fight it (ν = 1), i.e. C (∆M ; 1) < C (∆M ; 0) and C ′ (∆M ; 1) < C ′ (∆M ; 0). The
idea behind this assumption is that mobilization of citizens to fight an enemy helps create a
sense of national identity that allows the government to increase tax morale at lower costs than
in peace times.
We normalize to zero the per-period cost of a certain level of fiscal capacity and focus only
on the cost of increasing it. Similarly, we assume that the sanctions levied are dissipated and
do not go in the government budget. Finally, we ignore the fact that mobilization against the
threat could generate an increase in tax morale among citizens at zero costs. Considering all
these features would complicate our analysis without affecting our results.
2.2 Timing of Events
The game is played along two periods. The timing of events in period 1 is the following.
1. Individuals receive their income;
2. the existence of a threat µ ∈ {0, 1} for period 2 is revealed;
3. the government decides fiscal policy, the level of investment in fiscal capacity and tax
morale and sets the tax rate accordingly, i.e. {τ1,∆E,∆M};
4. individuals decide whether to pay or to evade taxes, ξj1 ∈ {0, 1};
5. the bureaucratic apparatus of the state checks whether citizens have paid taxes or not,
imposes the sanctions, and implement the fiscal policy.
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The timing of events in period 2 is the following.
1. Individuals receive their income;
2. the government decides whether to fight or not the threat if this exists, ν ∈ {0, 1}, and
sets its fiscal policy accordingly;
3. individuals decide whether to pay or to evade taxes, ξj2 ∈ {0, 1};
4. the bureaucratic apparatus of the state checks whether citizens have paid taxes or not,
imposes the sanctions, and implement the fiscal policy.
In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium of the game just described by focusing
on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE). Recall that an MPE is defined as a set
of Markovian strategies that are best responses to each other given every history; Markovian
strategies condition only on the payoff-relevant state variables and on the prior actions within
the same stage game.
2.3 The Equilibrium
We solve the equilibrium by backward induction starting from period 2 and first consider the
case where income redistribution is not possible when there is a threat.
We start by determining under which conditions the individuals pay taxes in period t ∈
{1, 2}. The utility from paying taxes is (1− τt)Y j while the expected utility of evading it is
Y j −Mt − Ejt . Therefore, agents in group j pay taxes when
τtY
j ≤Mt + Ejt , (2)
which clarify how the capacity of the state to raise revenues (the LHS of (2)) is determined
by the capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state (which determines Ejt ) and the tax
culture of citizens (Mt). To avoid that constraint (2) holds only for some groups and not for
others, which could lead to a strategic choice of the government to allow some groups to avoid
taxes, we assume the existence of a linear relationship between Y j and Ej so that the paying
taxes constraint (2) either holds for all groups or not.4 This implies that the constraint reduces
to τtY ≤Mt + Et.
The paying taxes constraint (2) also makes clear that the level of taxation may not be a
precise proxy for the capacity of the state to raise revenues or, better, that such a capacity is
4Allowing some groups to avoid taxes is equivalent to assuming selective income redistribution among groups,
which is a feature that complicates the analysis without providing interesting insights for our theory.
6
the result of the structure and efficiency of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and of the
tax culture of citizens that, as now show, can be molded by the state. This is the reason why
we distinguish here between fiscal capacity and tax morale.
Let us assume that group j is in power and decides the government policy in both periods.
Hence, the government solves the following maximization problem
max
{τ1,τ2,G,Q}
(1− τ1)Y j + (1− τ2)Y j + µγαjGβ + (1− µ)Qθ, (3)
subject to the government budget constraints in the two periods respectively given by
τ1Y = C (∆M ; ν) +H (∆E) , (4)
τ2Y = µG+ (1− µ)Q, (5)
and the paying taxes constraint (2) for both periods.
2.3.1 Wartime
Let us first consider the case where there is a threat (µ = 1) so that γ > 0. Substituting
(2), (4) and (5) into (3), and taking into account the paying taxes constraint (2) for period 2
that will hold with equality sign in equilibrium (i.e., E2 = τ2Y −M2), allows us to rewrite the
maximization problem as follows
max
{τ2,M2}
Y j − Y
j
Y
[C (M2 −M1; ν) +H (τ2Y −M2 − E1)] + (1− τ2)Y j + αjγτβ2 Y β. (6)
The first order conditions with respect to τ2 and M2 are respectively:
Y jH ′ (τ2Y −M2 − E1)− Y j − αjγβτβ−12 Y β = 0, (7)
Y j
Y
[
C ′ (M2 −M1; ν)−H ′ (τ2Y −M2 − E1)
]
= 0. (8)
Rearranging terms in these two expressions, we obtain that the optimal tax rate τ∗2 in period
2 and tax morale M∗2 are defined by the following system of equations:5[
1 +H ′(τ∗2Y −M∗2 − E1)
]
Y j = αjγβ(τ∗2 )
β−1Y β (9)
C ′ (M∗2 −M1; ν) = H ′ (τ∗2Y −M∗2 − E1) . (10)
Equation (9) tells us that in equilibrium the marginal benefit, on the RHS, must equalize the
marginal cost, on the LHS, of increasing taxes in period 2. Equation (10) additionally states
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M2
0
M∗2M ′2
O′
O
H ′, C ′
τ2Y − E1
τ2Y − E′1
−M1
C ′
H ′
Figure 1: The equilibrium condition of the expansion cost of the two fiscal instruments.
that in equilibrium the two instruments, tax morale and fiscal capacity, to expand taxes must
be equally costly at the margin.
To further clarify the mechanism at work, Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium value of tax
morale in period 2, M∗2 , obtained when the marginal cost of expanding tax morale, C ′(∆M),
intersects from below the marginal cost of expanding fiscal capacity, H ′(∆E). Notice that
when M2 < M
∗
2 the cost of enlarging the bureaucratic apparatus outweighs at the margin the
cost of mobilizing tax payers. Likewise, when M2 > M
∗
2 expanding tax morale is more costly
at the margin. The equilibrium is therefore the optimal allocation of resources that permits to
achieve the highest level of tax revenues.
By the same token, it is intuitive to show that a state with an initially higher level of
fiscal capacity, say E′1, can reach an equilibrium characterized by a lower level of mobilization,
M ′2 < M∗2 . An initial higher level of E1, in fact, permits the state to obtain the same expansion
of fiscal capacity between the two periods up to E2 in a less costly way. Graphically, the line H
′
shifts backward and the new intersection point, O′, gives the new optimal level of mobilization
M ′2.
Residually, from (τ∗2 ;M∗2 ) we obtained the optimal level of fiscal capacity as
E∗2 = τ
∗
2Y −M∗2 , (11)
and the optimal level of public good provided as G∗ = τ∗2Y . From the government budget
constraint (4) it follows that the tax rate required to finance the investments in fiscal capacity
5Second order condition holds from the assumption of convex costs, i.e. H ′′(·) > 0 and C′′(·) > 0. β < 1
guarantees a global maximum.
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and in tax morale in period 1 is
τ∗1 =
C (M∗2 −M1; ν) +H (E∗2 − E1)
Y
, (12)
as long as τ∗1 and τ∗2 are both lower than τˆ , which we assume to be the case.6 The following
proposition summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1 If the country faces a threat (µ = 1) of level γ and the government attaches
a marginal utility αj to this public good, then the government’s optimal policy is the set
(τ∗2 ;M∗2 ;E∗2 ; τ∗1 ) determined respectively by (9), (10), (11), and (12).
It is immediate that higher weights attached by the government to defeat the enemy (i.e.,
higher αj) and higher levels of threat (i.e., higher γ) imply a higher provision of G and,
therefore, a higher tax rate τ∗2 necessary to finance it. This in turn requires high investments
in fiscal capacity, ∆E = E∗2 −E1, and high investments in tax morale, ∆M = M∗2 −M1, that
allow the government to collect the revenues necessary to finance the military.
2.3.2 Peacetime
We now compare the government’s optimal policy set obtained in war times with that in which
the government does not expect any threat of war. This would allow us to compare tax morale
formation and fiscal capacity expansion in wartime and in peacetime. Recall that in peace
times µ = 0. Henceforth (3) reduces to
max
{τ1,τ2,Q}
(1− τ1)Y j + (1− τ2)Y j +Qθ, (13)
whereas the government budget constraint to τ2Y = Q. The first order conditions with respect
to τ2 and M2 are respectively:
Y jH ′ (τ2Y −M2 − E1)− Y j − θτ θ−12 Y θ = 0, (14)
Y j
Y
[
C ′ (M2 −M1; ν = 0)−H ′ (τ2Y −M2 − E1)
]
= 0. (15)
We can therefore obtain the optimal tax rate τ˜2 in period 2 and tax morale M˜2 in peacetime
as [
1 +H ′(τ˜2Y − M˜2 − E1)
]
Y j = θ(τ˜2)
θ−1Y θ (16)
6If τ∗1 and/or τ
∗
2 are higher than τˆ , then the solution to problem (3) involve some corner solutions. We do
not discuss this case here because it would only complicate the comparative statics analysis without providing
further insights. We do not consider either the case where the optimal tax rate in the second period is such
that the paying taxes constraint (2) is not satisfied without investments in fiscal capacity or tax morale, i.e.
τ∗2 Y > M1 + E1, as otherwise the problem is not of interest for our theory.
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M2
0
M˜2 M
∗
2
O
O˜
H ′, C ′
τ2Y − E1
−M1
C ′(ν = 0)
C ′(ν = 1)
H ′
Figure 2: The equilibrium condition of the expansion cost of the two fiscal instruments in
wartime and peacetime.
C ′
(
M˜2 −M1; ν = 0
)
= H ′
(
τ˜2Y − M˜2 − E1
)
, (17)
and residually E˜2 = τ˜2Y − M˜2.
Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium in peacetime, M˜2, obtained when the marginal cost of
expanding tax morale, C ′(∆M,ν = 0), intersects from below the marginal cost of expanding
fiscal capacity, H ′(∆E), and compares it with the equilibrium obtained in wartime, M∗2 . As
Figure 2 shows, people mobilization is less costly at the margin when the state engages in a
war (ν = 1). Graphically, we have that C ′ rotates backward moving the equilibrium from
M˜2 to M
∗
2 , with M˜2 < M
∗
2 . Intuitively, at each level of M2, the marginal cost of increasing
tax morale in peace times is larger than in war times, C ′ (∆M ; 1) < C ′ (∆M ; 0), so that a
comparison of equation (17) and equation (10) yields that the government finds it optimal in
peacetime to pursue its capacity to raise revenues by a large increase in fiscal capacity (∆E)
and a relatively smaller increase in tax morale (∆M).
The following lemma summarizes these results.
Lemma 1 High threats (γ) leads to a large expansion of government revenues (τ∗2 ) that are
implemented through a large expansion of fiscal capacity (∆E∗) and tax morale (∆M∗). In
peace times (ν = 0), the same increase in revenues (i.e., the same level of τ∗2 ) is instead
implemented through a larger increase in fiscal capacity and a smaller increase in tax morale.
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3 Coevolution of tax morale and fiscal capacity
The previous set-up can be easily expanded to describe the coevolution of fiscal capacity and
the culture of tax compliance. To this end, we now consider an economy populated by a
countable infinity of non-overlapping generations of citizens. Each generation is constituted
by a continuum of agents of measure one who live for two sub-periods. In each of the two
sub-periods, events and actions are those described in Section 2.1. We refer to the timescale
in which a generation is born and dies as t.
3.1 Socialization and transmission of tax morale across generations
At the end of the second sub-period (before dying), parents decide the effort in socialization,
δ ∈ [0, 1], that they use to transmit their level of tax morale, Mt, to their offspring.
Socialization has costs and benefits. When parents exert an effort equal to δ, they bear a
cost equals to K(δ;Et) and add δMt units of tax morale to their children with respect to a
baseline level of tax morale M . In particular, we assume that the socialization technology is
more efficient when fiscal capacity is high: K(δ;E′′t ) < K(δ;E′t) for any E′′t > E′t ≥ 0. The idea
is that convincing children that cheating on taxes is bad is easier when the state itself invests
in fiscal capacity and therefore rents from tax evasion are more limited. We also assume
that socializing children is less costly at the margin when fiscal capacity Et is higher (i.e.,
K ′(δ;E′′t ) < K ′(δ;E′t)) and becomes unaffordable when the state has no fiscal capacity (i.e.,
K ′(δ;Et = 0) = +∞). When parents do not transmit their values in complying with taxes (i.e.,
δ = 0), the young generation obtains a tax morale M ≡M(γ) > 0, with M ′(γ) < 0 capturing
the idea that the experience of a war and more external threat may have a disruptive effect
on the baseline level of such values in the society. An effort equals to δ adds δMt units of tax
morale to their children. The utility derived by parents from transmitting tax morale to their
offspring is V st (γ); we assume that this utility is higher when parents have been exposed during
their life to a war, i.e. ∂V st (γ)/∂γ > 0. The idea is that war changes persistently parents’
preferences for redistribution and helps overcoming collective actions problems making the
transmission of tax morale more salient.
The evolution of tax morale across generations is therefore represented by the following
equation:
Mt+1 = M(γ) + δMt, (18)
and the change of tax morale in the economy from generation t to generation t+ 1 is given by:
∆Mt+1 ≡Mt+1 −Mt = M(γ) + (δ − 1)Mt. (19)
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δ
0
δ∗ δ¯δ˜
V st (γ
′)
V st (γ)
K ′(δ;Et)
K ′(δ;E′t)
Figure 3: The optimal socialization effort δ∗ and its variation due to an increase in fiscal
capacity from Et to E
′
t or due to an increase in the intensity of the war threat from γ to γ
′.
The effort of socialization is optimally decided in equilibrium by parents after solving the
following maximization problem:
max
δ
δV st (γ)−K(δ;Et), (20)
and the first order condition of (20) yields the optimal socialization effort δ∗ chosen by each
individual of generation t:
V st (γ) = K
′(δ∗;Et). (21)
Note that the marginal benefit from the socialization increases with the utility that parents
attach to a son with a high level of tax morale which, in turn, increases with the exposure to
warfare. On the other hand, the marginal cost reduces with the stock of fiscal capacity that
the government has enacted to collect revenues and enforce the law. When the two are equals,
parents optimally exert an effort equals to δ∗(γ,Et).
In Figure 3, we illustrate the optimal effort of socialization. When the level of fiscal capacity
in the economy is Et, the optimal effort, δ
∗, is obtained from the intersection between the flat
line V st (γ), the LHS in equation (21), and the marginal cost K
′(δ;Et), the RHS in equation
(21). Note that, as we illustrate in Figure 3, the optimal effort of socialization increases if
fiscal capacity Et is higher as well as if the intensity of the threat of war γ goes up. The first
variation, from Et to E
′
t, generates a rightward shift in the marginal cost from K
′(δ;Et) to
K ′(δ;E′t). As a result, the effort increases up to δ˜ triggering the transmission of tax morale.
The second variation, from γ to γ′, generates an upward shift in the marginal benefit from
V st (γ) to V
s
t (γ
′), which generates an increase of the effort up to δ¯.
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Substituting the optimal effort of socialization, δ∗(γ,Et), into equation (18) yields the
following equilibrium dynamics of tax morale from generation t to generation t+ 1
Mt+1 = M(γ) + δ
∗(γ,Et)Mt, (22)
which depends on the stock of fiscal capacity in the economy and on the level of threat.
3.2 The natural level of tax morale
At the steady state ∆Mt+1 = 0. From Equation (19), this implies that the steady state (or
natural) level of tax morale Mˆ is as follows:
Mˆ =
M(γ)
1− δ∗(γ,E0) . (23)
For any level of δ∗(γ,Et) < 1, the steady state level of tax morale in (23) is globally stable
and, given the initial condition M0, each economy converges to it. We summarize this result
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Denote M(γ) as the baseline value of tax morale of generation t. Given the
initial conditions M0 and E0, the steady state level of tax morale Mˆ to which the economy
converges is given by (23). It is unique and globally stable for any values of δ∗(γ,E0) < 1.
3.3 Comparative statics on the steady-state
The natural value of tax morale strictly depends on the war exposition of generation t, γ, and
on the level of fiscal capacity that the government has accumulated up to generation t, Et.
In particular, our theory highlights two opposing effects of war on tax morale: on one hand,
war may have a disruptive effect on the baseline value of tax morale; on the other hand, an
increase in the intensity of the war threat makes socialization more salient. A priori, the effect
of war intensity on Mˆ is ambiguous. An increase in the stock of fiscal capacity generates an
unambiguous positive effect on Mˆ by making socialization more efficient for parents. Variations
in these two key parameters may generate change in δ∗(γ,Et) and through this channel can
explain variations in the natural rate of tax morale, Mˆ .
To see that consider two extreme cases that capture a low and a large natural level of tax
morale, respectively. First, note from equation (23) that if parents optimally decide to not
carry on any socialization effort (i.e., if δ∗(γ,Et) = 0) the natural value of tax morale reduces
to its baseline (i.e., Mˆ = M(γ)). Note that this is the case when Et approaches to 0, so that
the cost of socialization becomes unaffordable. In Figure 3 this situation is captured by a shift
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to the left of the line K ′(δ;Et) that continues as long as K ′(δ;Et) leans on the y-axis. Note
that if Et = 0 then δ
∗(γ,Et = 0) = 0 and Mˆ = M(γ), regardless of whether generation t has
been exposed to a war or not. The exposure to a war hence will solely produce a negative
effect because of its disruptive power on values. Second, if parents optimally decide to fully
socialize their children (i.e., if δ∗(γ,Et) = 1), tax morale continues to grow from generation to
generation and the natural value of tax morale diverges to infinity. This corner solution arises
when Et is maximal, which makes the cost of socialization null and the line K
′(δ;Et) in Figure
3 flat along the x-axis.
For any interior solution of δ∗(γ,Et), whether war generates a positive or a negative effect
on tax morale depends on which of the two effects dominate between disruption of values and
the overcoming of the collective action problem. In the following proposition, we show that
there exists an intermediate value of fiscal capacity E† > 0 such that the disruption effect
dominates on the positive one if Et < E
†, while the boost on socialization dominates the
negative effect of the war on tax morale if Et ≥ E†.
Proposition 3 Denote Mˆ(γ,Et) as the steady state level of tax morale. There exists a value
of fiscal capacity E† > 0 such that:
- If Et < E
†, then ∂Mˆ(γ;Et)∂γ < 0.
- If Et ≥ E†, then ∂Mˆ(γ;Et)∂γ ≥ 0.
In Section 4 we test this prediction of the theory.
4 Empirical evidence
In this section we present novel empirical evidence on the link between tax morale, fiscal
capacity, and war. Our interest here is on the effect of war on tax morale. Our main innovation
with respect to Feldman and Slemrod (2009) stands on pinning down heterogeneous effects of
conflicts on tax compliance according to whether government invests in fiscal capacity or not.
Additionally, our analysis differentiates from Feldman and Slemrod (2009) for employing a
longer time horizon in war frequency and for putting emphasis on intrastate wars.7 This
approach allows us to shed light on the conducive role of wars, and in particular civil wars, for
rising tax morale.
7As we shall explain below, we start counting wars and years under conflicts from the 1939—the year in
which the WWII has its start. This approach is consistent with the so-called “ratchet effect” according to which
a war experience persistently moves tax morale level upward and never returns to its starting level (e.g., Rasler
and Thompson, 1985; Kiser and Linton, 2001).
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4.1 Data and empirical strategy
Our empirical analysis uses a large set of variables whose descriptive statistics are reported in
Table 1. First of all, we use information on tax morale from seven waves of the World Value
Survey (WVS) and European Value Survey (EVS). The period we look at covers more than
30 years, from 1980 (first wave) to the 2012 (last wave). The two surveys ask the following
question F116, on a 1-10 scale: “Cheating on taxes, if you have a chance, is: 1 = never
justifiable, 10 = always justifiable.” We rescale it so that higher values of it correspond to
a higher tax morale of the individual and compute weighted averages at country-wave level.
Overall, we collect 199 data points across 61 countries. Tax morale ranges from 6.88 to 10,
with higher values indicating a country with a population more willing to comply with taxes.
The average level of tax morale is 8.76.
Secondly, from Correlates of Wars (COW) we use information on the number of wars fought
by a given country and those disputed by the government within its territory against rebel
groups after the start of the World War II.8 Alternatively, we use information on same conflicts
at the intensive margin, measuring wars through the number of years under an internal or an
external war. On average, we count 1.28 wars fought by each country from 1939 to 2010.
However, we observe a large variation across countries (sd = 2.37): Indonesia has fought 9
civil wars whereas the United States and China have combated 7 and 6 international wars
respectively. Many others have never been involved in neither of the two. In terms of number
of years under a conflict, we count 4.62 years on an average level, that in proportion means
about 8% of wartime out of total time. Since several countries have embarked in endless wars
in the last sixty years, these data account for a substantial variation (sd = 9.21).9
For measuring fiscal capacity we rely mostly on Besley and Persson (2009)’s version of the
IMF data on taxes. These data are from 1975 onward. As in Besley and Persson (2009), we
employ percentages of income taxes on GDP and percentages of total taxes on GDP. The idea
behind the first measure is that income is difficult to tax unless the country makes investment
in fiscal capacity. The second measure is intended as a “catch-all” measure of fiscal capacity.
Besley and Persson’s sample reports an average income tax rate of about 15%, with a maximum
of 34.60%, and an average total tax rate of 26.62%, with a maximum of 50%. We also use
8The World War II represented a crucial shock for participating countries that forced them to mobilize
citizens against the enemy. See, for example, Polenberg (1972) and Bank, Stark, and Thorndike (2008) on the
United States experience. However, our results are also robust to the exclusion of the time-window 1939-1945.
9Philippines fought more than 40 years. First its government embarked in a 20 years civil wars (guerilla)
against the New People’s Army (1972-1992), then with a minoritarian Muslim group, the Moro population.
Similarly, Colombia’s government fought for 33 years a guerilla against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC).
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percentages of revenue from trade taxes and from indirect taxes. The idea is that governments
in countries with little fiscal capacity tend to use border taxes, the easiest to track. On average
we observe a percentage of revenue from trade taxes of 42% and that from indirect taxes of
about 58%. Since we look for a proxy of fiscal capacity we construct a variable which is 100
minus percentages of revenue from trade taxes (or indirect taxes).
Finally, we employ a large set of controls for estimating meaningful correlations between
wars and tax morale. We use the (logarithm of) GDP per capita (PPP in constant 2011
international dollars) and the population to control for the size of the country. Both come
from the World Development Indicators database and are country averages between 1980
and 2012. We then use the Alesina et al. (2005) index of ethnic fragmentation to hold size
potential conflicts over public goods that might encourage or discourage tax compliance. An
index of corruption and one of government effectiveness are used to control for the quality of
the government that might affect external motivation in paying taxes or reciprocity. The two
indexes are computed as averages from the World Government Indicators database between
1996 (the first year reported) and the 2014. All the specifications control for the share of the
main religions in the country in the eighties (Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim) and a set of
dummies indicating the legal origin of the country. They all come from La Porta et al. (1999).
Using this information structure, we estimate the following benchmark regression:
TaxMoraleit = α+ βWari + δ (Wari × τi) +Xi γ + ηt + εit, (24)
where i indicates countries and t WVS waves. Wari is either the total number of conflicts in
which country i has been involving or international disputes or civil wars. τi is one of the four
measures of fiscal capacity discussed above. Xi is a vector of controls, whereas ηt is year fixed
effect that we introduce to capture differential trends in tax morale due to time. Since this is
not sufficient to absorb the entire intraclass correlation within a country we cluster standard
errors εit at country level.
We estimate (24) using pooling ordinary least squares. Since our interest relies on the effect
of wars on tax morale, we compute marginal effects of war on tax morale for different values
of fiscal capacity, that is m(τi) = β + δ × τi. According to our theory, we expect m(τi) to be
negative for low values of τi and positive for high values of it. In words, we expect conflicts
to favor a culture of tax compliance when expanding the country’s fiscal capacity is relatively
more costly. In countries where expanding fiscal capacity is cheaper war is expected to be
culture disruptive.
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4.2 Results
We present our main results in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5, each of them using a different measure of
fiscal capacity. In Table 2 and 3 we use percentages of income taxes on GDP and percentages
of total taxes on GDP, respectively. Tables 4 and 5 report our estimations when we employ
percentages of trade taxes on tax revenues and percentages of indirect taxes on tax revenues.
Let us consider first percentages of income taxes on GDP. In the first column of Table
2 we estimate a negative correlation between income taxes and tax morale, conditional on
controlling for GDP per capita, population, ethnic fragmentation, the shares of main religions
and legal origin dummies that might affect simultaneously the adoption of a given tax schedule
and influencing the formation of a tax culture of compliance. Countries with higher levels
of income taxes are less willing to comply with tax payment. On the other side, we find
that countries that experienced more conflicts have a lower level of tax morale, although the
estimation, reported in column 2, is not statistically significant different from zero. In column
3 we combine the two sources of interest as in equation (24). While both fiscal capacity and
wars negatively correlate with tax morale, their interaction has a positive sign. We find similar
results irrespective to the type of wars combated (international wars in column 5 and civil wars
in column 7).
This result brings support in favor of a complementary effect of war and fiscal capacity
on tax morale. War produces culture disruptive consequences when countries have a poor
fiscal capacity, but when the state is capable of channeling additional tax revenues from an
increase in tax morale war may produce beneficial effects. We can appreciate the hand-in-hand
movement of tax morale and fiscal capacity when countries have more frequent wars in Figure
4. Figure 4 is organized along three panels. On the left we trace the marginal elasticity of war
on tax morale (in the y-axis) for different percentages of income tax on GDP (in the x-axis).
In the mid panel we report the same information when we use only a percentage change in
international wars, whereas in the right we use only a percentage change in civil wars. The
central line represents the point estimation of the marginal elasticity and is surrounded by the
two confidence bands at 95%.
When we use the total number of conflicts, we find a statistically significant marginal
elasticity of -0.021 for countries with the minimum level of income taxes, namely 0.30. For
these countries, a 1% increase in war is associated with a 0.021% decrease in tax morale. The
effect is monotone and negative up to an income tax rate of 5.7 in percentage of the GDP.
For countries with a level of fiscal capacity higher than 20%, in terms of income tax rate,
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the marginal effect turns on the positive sign up to a 0.030% increase in tax morale. When
we use alternatively international or civil wars, we find the same monotonicity result and the
same discontinuity between countries with low and high fiscal capacity, but when we measure
conflicts using civil wars both the negative and the positive effect on tax morale are much
larger. Specifically, when income tax rate is below 5.6 a 1% more of civil wars is associated
with a reduction of about 0.027% in tax morale. In countries with income tax rate higher than
12% the effect turns on the positive sign up to 0.059% on tax morale. This effect is 4 times
larger than with international wars.
In Table 3 we look at the same relation using percentages of total taxes on GDP. This index
is broader than that using income taxes and contains several dimensions of fiscal capacity.
The table is organized in exactly the same way of Table 2, and therefore columns 2, 4, and
6 coincide with those reported in Table 2. In the first column we report our estimation of
the conditional correlation between total taxes in percentage of the GDP and tax morale.
As expected, the correlation is negative (-0.019) but smaller than the one estimated through
income taxes. Turning on the link between tax morale, fiscal capacity, and wars we find
similar results of Table 2; both fiscal capacity and wars are negatively associated with tax
morale but their interaction has a positive sign. Once again, we find a stronger effect for
civil wars (column 7) than for international disputes (column 5). We present the marginal
elasticities in Figure 5. The three panels, total number of wars, international conflicts, and
civil wars, report similar patterns and, in all the three cases, in countries with low rates of
total taxes tax morale is negatively associated with conflict but positively if a country has
large bureaucratic apparatus behind. This is particularly evident for civil wars. Civil wars are
substantially culture-disruptive in countries with poor fiscal capacity (-0.048%), but may be
an effective tool for mobilizing citizens (the marginal elasticity is +0.063%).
Finally, in Tables 4 and 5, and in Figures 6 and 7, we use 100 minus percentages of
revenue from trade taxes and 100 minus percentages of revenue from indirect taxes as two
alternative measures of fiscal capacity. Our findings here confirm previous results: in countries
with low fiscal capacity, using border taxes (or indirect taxes) as a main fiscal instrument,
conflicts are negatively associated with tax morale; in those that use predominantly other
more sophisticated fiscal instruments, more wars have a beneficial effect in forming a culture
of tax compliance. In terms of magnitude of the marginal elasticities, we find that in the
first type of countries a 1% increase in war is associated with about a 0.060% decrease in tax
morale when we use the share of trade taxes and -0.032% when the share of indirect taxes are
employed. In the second type of countries, with high fiscal capacity, the marginal elasticity is
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positive but never larger than 0.017%.
In Appendix A we replicate our empirical analysis using years of wars at the place of
number of wars. Although the two measures deliver different information on a country’s
conflicts, the two are highly correlated (correlation is 0.857). Not surprisingly we hence find
substantially same results. As before, we present regression results using income taxes on GDP
in Table A1, total taxes in Table A2, percentages of revenue from trade taxes in Table A3,
and those from indirect taxes in Table A4. In all these alternative specifications we find the
interaction term between war and fiscal capacity to be positive. Likewise, Figures A1, A2, A3,
A4 trace marginal elasticities for different values of the cross-country distribution in terms of
fiscal capacity. In all these graphs we find similar magnitudes and same pattern across levels
of fiscal capacity. Clustered standard errors are slightly bigger because of a more disperse
cross-country distribution of years of wars.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that past exposure to conflicts might induce the government to invest
in tax morale formation in addition to expanding fiscal capacity. While the second mechanism
has been investigated at large, the first one has remained confined to descriptive evidence. We
examine this idea by developing a theoretical model with a clear-cut mechanism: war reduces
the marginal relative cost of mobilizing people making investment in tax compliance culture
cheaper. The reduction of such a cost also required a consolidated fiscal capacity. From this
relation emerges a dynamic complementarity that we derive in a multi-periods set-up.
We argue and show that this mechanism is consistent with cross-country evidence that
we have presented in Section 4. Our estimates show that war frequency (either internal or
external) explains tax morale variation across country. Our analysis outlines heterogeneous
results according with the level of fiscal capacity. Those with a consolidated level of fiscal
capacity, that is with high income tax rate on GDP or with high level of total taxes or with
a small share of revenue from trade or indirect taxes, have population more compliant with
paying taxes if exposed to more conflicts in the past. In terms of magnitude we estimate a
marginal elasticity around 0.03% and 0.06% according to different measures of tax morale.
Conversely, we find a negative and sizable marginal effect of war exposure to tax morale in
countries with poor fiscal capacity, and much larger when the source is a civil war. This result
is consistent with the literature on inefficiency persistence.
The punchline of this study is that culture matters in explaining cross-country variation
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in tax compliance. For long time its role has been neglected, in favor of more reduced form
approach directly going from war to state capacity. In line with recent development of the
economic theory, we argue that a culture of compliance is a prerequisite to sustain and hefty tax
burden. Future research can further amply our knowledge of tax morale formation exploiting
historical junctures in the last century.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max count
tax morale 8.76 0.62 6.88 10.00 199
income τ 14.99 10.86 0.30 34.60 199
total τ 26.62 12.42 2.21 50.81 199
100 - trade τ 58.03 12.24 16.34 67.99 199
100 - indirect τ 41.77 18.98 0.00 68.61 199
# wars 1.28 2.37 0.00 9.00 199
# inter. wars 0.61 1.61 0.00 7.00 199
# civ. wars 0.67 1.45 0.00 9.00 199
wars (years) 4.62 9.21 0.00 41.00 199
inter. wars (years) 1.36 4.23 0.00 22.00 199
civ. wars (years) 3.27 7.85 0.00 41.00 199
Ethnic Fract. 0.32 0.26 0.00 0.93 199
Corruption Index 0.82 1.15 -1.18 2.43 199
Govt. Effectiveness 0.86 0.99 -1.09 2.15 199
GDP per capita (log) 9.77 1.04 6.71 11.30 193
Population (log) 17.03 1.64 12.56 20.93 199
Catholics (share) 35.87 37.66 0.00 96.90 199
Muslims (share) 12.98 28.66 0.00 99.40 199
Protestants (share) 21.99 30.09 0.00 97.80 199
English L.O. 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 199
French L.O. 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 199
Socialist L.O. 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 199
Scandinavian L.O. 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 199
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Figure 4: Number of Wars, Income Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure 5: Number of Wars, Total Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure 6: Number of Wars, Revenue from Trade Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure 7: Number of Wars, Revenue from Indirect Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure A1: Years of Wars, Income Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure A2: Years of Wars, Total Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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Figure A3: Years of Wars, Revenues from Trade Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
-
.
08
-
.
06
-
.
04
-
.
02
0
.
02
20 30 40 50 60 70
100 - %(Rev. from Trade Taxes)
Years of Wars (all)
-
.
08
-
.
06
-
.
04
-
.
02
0
.
02
20 30 40 50 60 70
100 - %(Rev. from Trade Taxes)
Years of International Wars
-
.
08
-
.
06
-
.
04
-
.
02
0
.
02
20 30 40 50 60 70
100 - %(Rev. from Trade Taxes)
Years of Civil Wars
Marginal Elasticities on Tax Morale of 1% of Wars
39
Figure A4: Years of Wars, Revenues from Indirect Taxes, and Tax Morale. Marginal Elasticity
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